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INTRODUCTION
A growing army of theorists have struck out in attack mode against the notion of a pre-reflective,
minimal sense of self or sense of ownership (e.g., Dainton, 2008, 2016; Bermúdez, 2011, in press;
Prinz, 2012; Di Francesco et al., 2016; Garfield, 2016). To defend against such attacks I’ll follow a
divide and conquer strategy. Specifically, in this paper I take on the deflationary and eliminativist
arguments advanced by Bermúdez, Dainton, and Di Francesco and colleagues.1 My tactic will be
to use a form of philosophical Jujitsu. That is, I’ll use the power of the critics’ own arguments
against them by showing (1) that the pre-reflective sense of ownership is, on the phenomenological
accounts that are criticized, intrinsic to experience, rather than some additional quality, and this
is just what the deflationary account requires; (2) that the concept of a pre-reflective sense of
ownership is consistent with the empirical evidence that the critics themselves cite; and (3) that a
more positive account of the sense of ownership is to be found in the phenomenologically inspired
enactivist (action-oriented) view of experience as always embodied and most often agentive.
The notion of the sense of ownership (SO) is a complex one. First, the phrase itself may be
misleading. The term ‘ownership’ typically applies to the ownership of things, objects, or property
and tends to signify a legal claim about such property. Clearly, one’s body is not piece of property,
except perhaps in a metaphorical sense. We are not in this kind of relationship of ownership
to our own body. One can agree with Bermúdez on this point; he suggests that “ownership is
a rather tenuous and metaphorical concept in this context. We do not own hands . . .. . . in the
way that we own personal property” (in press). Although there are contexts in which the concept
1

I’ll focus on the eliminativist views expressed in Bermúdez and defended by Di Francesco and colleagues. Prinz (2012) also
offers what can be considered an eliminativist proposal – that there just is no experiential sense of self. Likewise, Garfield
(2016, p. 73) claims, there is “nothing that it is like to have qualitative experience.”
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of legal ownership of one’s body may be appropriate,2
in the context that we are considering here, which
involves a phenomenological conception, this would be a
misunderstanding. In this context, however, we find the
phrase ‘sense of ownership’ in use at least from the mid1990s, for example in Martin (1995), who defines it as “the
phenomenological quality that [a] body part appears to be
part of one’s body” (Martin, 1995, p. 269; see Martin, 1992).
Moreover, this concept, if not this specific phrase, had been
discussed by earlier philosophers, such as Husserl, and in the
phenomenological psychiatry tradition following Jaspers. Rather
than the term ‘ownership,’ however, phenomenologists tend to
use the term mineness or the experience of mineness (see, e.g.,
Hopkins, 1993).
Importantly, SO or the sense of mineness, applies not only
to one’s body or one’s body parts; it also applies to movement,
action, and even to experience itself. I may have a sense that this
is my action, or my thinking, or, most basically, my experience
(Gallagher, 2000). Guillot’s (2017) offers some clarification on this
by distinguishing between three phenomena.

thought insertion, however, there are two important points to
take from the idea that SO is missing in such exceptional or
pathological circumstances. First, it implies that SO is clearly not
a necessary or essential aspect of all experience, but also, second,
it implies that SO is present in everyday normal experience.
The phenomenological view is that SO/mineness is
experienced in the pre-reflective (or non-reflective) selfawareness that is intrinsic in everyday (non-pathological, nonexceptional) conscious experience. It is experienced as this
pre-reflective self-awareness and is nothing over and above this
pre-reflective self-awareness (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012, 2014).
Nor does it require an extra or transitive act of self-awareness
which takes experience as an object. Accordingly, it is also
important to distinguish this first-order, pre-reflective SO from a
retrospective (reflective) judgment about ownership (Vosgerau
and Newen, 2007).

THE DEFLATIONARY ACCOUNT
Martin’s (1995) use of the phrase ‘sense of ownership’ was meant
to describe an experience of one’s spatial boundaries. According
to Martin, “when one feels a sensation, one thereby feels as if
something is occurring within one’s body” (p. 267). This is not
a matter of explicit judgment, as if I were experiencing a freefloating sensation concerning which I needed to judge its spatial
location as falling within my body boundaries. Rather, as Martin
argues, the experience of location is an intrinsic feature of the
sensation itself. This experience just is the SO for one’s body
as a whole, so that I have SO for particular body parts only as
being parts of that whole body (Martin, 1995, pp. 277–278). In
this regard, SO is not a quality in addition to other qualities of
experience, but “already inherent within them” (p. 278). This is
consistent with the phenomenological view: SO is an intrinsic
aspect of proprioceptive and kinaesthetic experiences of bodily
movement, and other bodily sensations.3
Bermúdez (2011, in press), however, in a critical discussion
of SO, in contrast to Martin, rejects the idea that SO is a
“special phenomenological relation” (Martin, 1995, p. 267),
although he accepts the importance of “boundedness.” He
denies that there is a positive first-order (non-observational)
phenomenology of ownership or feeling of ‘mineness.’ In
contrast to what he calls an “inflationary” conception, which
he attributes to phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty (he also
cites Gallagher, 2005; de Vignemont, 2007, 2013), he offers a
deflationary account. “On a deflationary conception of ownership
the sense of ownership consists, first, in certain facts about the
phenomenology of bodily sensations and, second, in certain
fairly obvious judgments about the body (which we can
term judgments of ownership)” (Bermúdez, 2011, p. 162). His
deflationary view is that an explicit experience of ownership

• For-me-ness – the awareness of the experience as I live through
it
• Me-ness – a pre-reflective self-awareness that I am the one
living through the experience
• Mineness – the sense that this is my experience (ownership),
i.e., an awareness of the experience as my own.
Guillot argues that in non-pathological/normal experience we
have all three.
It is something about the experience, something intrinsic to it,
that supports judgments [about the experience]. This I take to
be at least a prima facie reason to think that we typically have
experiential access to the experience, to ourselves, and to the
fact that the experience is ours; or, in my terminology, that the
phenomenal character of a normal experience includes for-meness, me-ness, and mineness (Guillot, 2017, p. 47).

I think it is quite possible to accept these distinctions
as conceptual distinctions, without thinking that we actually
experience such distinctions, or that these differences are
experienced as such. On the phenomenological view, the
experience is precisely the experience of mineness (ownership),
which is an intrinsically relational experience, i.e., involving the
relation between me (as experiencer) and the experience itself,
rather than an experience of a relation. For-me-ness and me-ness
are, accordingly, abstractions from mineness that I can make in
reflective judgment.
Guillot also argues (following Billon, 2011) that in some
pathological cases mineness (or the sense of ownership)
goes missing. Without entering the various debates about
depersonalization and schizophrenic delusions of control and

3

de Vignemont (in press), suggests some qualifications to Martin’s analysis by
considering cases in which there is no SO for a bodily limb although sensations
may register on that limb. In these cases, e.g., somatoparaphrenia and the case of
IW, it is important to note that proprioception/kinaesthesia is missing (Gallagher
and Cole, 1995; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009). Accordingly, for a more precise
characterization of SO in terms of body boundaries, one should define such
boundaries as proprioceptive.

2

Petchesky (1995) for example, traces the use of the concept of body ownership
through a number of legal and historical contexts, and discusses a “shift in the
early-modern European origins of ideas about owning one’s body” which has less
to do with property rights in an economic sense and more to do with claims about
protecting “one’s sexuality and personal security from arbitrary invasion” (p. 390).
Also see, e.g., Pateman (1988) for use of this term in feminist discussions.
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with it a non-reflective (non-observational) awareness of my
phenomenal experience (the sensation content) which includes,
implicitly, the sense that this is happening to me. This is a
non-reflective self-awareness that, roughly, it is my stomach that
is moving upward, or perhaps something more indeterminate,
but nonetheless, an experience in or of my body. Bermúdez
endorses the idea that such experiences give us a sense of
boundedness and connectedness “from the inside.” Throughout
such proprioceptive experiences, however, there is a more or
less integrated pattern of experience in which body awareness
includes an intrinsic experience that it is my bodily experience.
That’s the proprio in proprioception.
It’s not clear what this kind of awareness could be, other than a
pre-reflective awareness that is built into (not something separate
and distinct from) the structure of precisely the experience
I have of my body or of a sensation that is located in my
body. This idea is consistent with both the phenomenological
view, and the deflationary account offered by Martin. This is
also what Dokic (2003) claims in an account that Bermúdez
identifies as deflationary. “Bodily experience gives us a sense of
ownership. . .. The very idea of feeling a pain in a limb which does
not seem to be ours is difficult to frame, perhaps unintelligible”
(Dokic, 2003, p. 325).

only comes up when we turn our reflective attention to our
bodily experience and attribute that experience to ourselves.
This, I think, is the only way to make sense of his claim that
“[w]hen we experience our bodies we experience them as our
own . . . there is a phenomenology of ownership” (Bermúdez,
2015, p. 38). I take this to mean that there is a second-order
phenomenology of ownership derived from the judgment of
ownership.4 A second-order experience of ownership results as
a product of this judgment, but it is not something that is there
to begin with. “There are facts about the phenomenology of
bodily awareness (about position sense, movement sense, and
interoception) and there are judgments of ownership, but there
is no additional feeling of ownership” (Bermúdez, 2011, p. 166).
Bermúdez thus comes close to the eliminativist view, since he
rejects the idea that there is “a specific feeling of ownership –
a qualitative ‘feel’ that one has in all and only those body parts
that one experiences as one’s own” (in press). According to
Bermúdez (2011) SO is a philosophical fiction. Although one
does experience a sense of body boundedness and connectedness,
one does not experience, in addition, SO as a separate and
independent feeling.
As we’ve seen, however, for the phenomenologists, to say
that SO is an intrinsic aspect of proprioceptive and kinaesthetic
experiences is to agree that it is not an additional or independent
feeling, but rather, a sense “already inherent within” the
phenomenology of bodily sensations. On the phenomenological
view, and in contrast to Bermúdez, this intrinsic aspect is prereflective in the sense that one has this intrinsic experience of
ownership without having to make a reflective judgment about
ownership. This can be read in the deflationary way, so that the
phenomenologists can agree that there is no additional feeling
of ownership, or “perfectly determinate ‘quale’ associated with
the feeling of myness” (Bermúdez, 2011, p. 165), independent of
the proprioceptive and kinaesthetic sensations. In contrast to the
eliminativist view, however, there is still an experiential SO. In
fact, this implicit self-experience is precisely what makes firstperson bodily (proprioceptive, kinaesthetic) awareness itself (i.e.,
prior to any judgment) a form of self-consciousness. It’s what puts
the ‘proprio’ in proprioception (Gallagher and Trigg, 2016).
Bermúdez doesn’t want to deny, however, that we can have a
proprioceptive and kinaesthetic awareness of bodily (and limb)
posture and movement. This is clear in his (2015) discussion
of an example from Anscombe (1962). Anscombe considers the
meaning of the expression ‘sensation of X’ in the example of
the sensation of going down in a lift. Does the phrase ‘the
sensation of going down in a lift’ signify (1) the subjective
feeling I have of an upward feeling in my stomach (the internal
description or content of the sensation), or (2) the objective event
of going down in a lift (the external accompaniment). Even if
my focus of attention is on the objective event, that focus carries

THE SENSE OF SELF IN THE
PHENOMENAL BACKGROUND
Dainton (2008), in his discussion of what he terms the “isolation
thesis,” i.e., the idea that there could be just one isolated bodily
sensation, e.g., of pain, takes issue with the phenomenological
concept of pre-reflective self-awareness. Typically, in contrast
to the isolation thesis, when I experience some sensation I
experience it “against the backdrop of various other forms of
consciousness: a range of bodily experience, tactile sensations,
visual and auditory experience, intentional or willed bodily
movements, conscious thinking . . . [etc.]” (2008, pp. 239–240).
This backdrop of experience, to which we are not attending when
we attend to the pain, he calls the ‘phenomenal background.’ This
background consists of two regions – a worldly region where I
experience, e.g., in exteroception, the sights and sounds around
me, and an “inner” region, an elusive set of bodily experiences,
thoughts, memories, and so on. He suggests that this inner aspect
of the phenomenal background contributes to (and perhaps
constitutes) “the feeling of what it is typically like to be me
(or you)’ (p. 240). This inner background may be relatively stable,
as Dainton suggests, but it does not consist of a particular kind of
sensation or feeling. Specifically, he argues, it does not consist of
a pre-reflective self-awareness or sense of mineness or ownership.
I can see no reason to take this stability as indicative of a single
special type of experience, something over and above the changing
stream of thought, perception, volition, emotion, memory, bodily
sensation, and so on (p. 240).

4

See Alsmith (2015). Also, de Vignemont (in press) attempts to clarify this by
distinguishing between a ‘feeling of myness’ understood as a first-order experience,
which she associates with the inflationary account; and a sense of ownership as a
second-order phenomenology, which Bermúdez associates with the deflationary
account. I am not distinguishing between a sense of mineness and a sense of
ownership – I treat both phrases as signifying a first-order aspects of experience
distinguishable from the judgment of ownership.
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there would be nothing of experience left; therefore, there is
nothing over and above just these experiences – no extra or
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experience, but rather the joint product of several different sorts
of (quite ordinary) experiences” (p. 243).
If we accept Dainton’s argument, then there does exist
a sense of mineness or SO, but it is not a special or
additional quality, or a primitive pre-reflective self-awareness
added to the phenomenal background. Does this actually
constitute an argument against the phenomenological concept
of sense of mineness or ownership? It’s difficult to see how
it would count against the phenomenological conception since
the phenomenologists, including Zahavi, describe the sense of
mineness as an intrinsic aspect of experience, not as something
extra that is added, or an additional quality that one experiences
in addition to experiencing pain, or bodily sensations, or
thinking, etc. To repeat Dainton’s quotation from Zahavi:
“Whether a certain experience is experienced as mine or not,
however, depends not on something apart from the experience,
but precisely on the givenness of the experience” (2005, p. 124).
As Zahavi most recently put it:

additional experience that we would identify as the experience
of mineness. Rather, he suggests, the “ambient ‘sense of self ”’
is something like the product of all of these experiences. This
phenomenal background is always something of which we are coconscious, but always something precisely in the background, and
of which we are not explicitly aware. It’s this ubiquitous presence
of the phenomenal background – this ambient sense of self –
that makes it impossible to imagine an “ownerless” isolated pain
sensation.
Dainton takes this argument to undermine the
phenomenological claim that there is a particular form of
self-consciousness, of the minimal or ‘non-reflexive’ variety, that
always accompanies experience. Zahavi, whom Dainton quotes,
defends this sort of phenomenological claim.
One commonality [shared by all experiences] is the quality
of mineness, the fact that experiences are characterized by
first-person givenness. That is, the experience is given [i.e.,
experienced] (at least tacitly) as my experience, as an experience
I am undergoing or living through. . .. Phenomenal consciousness
must be interpreted precisely as entailing a minimal or thin form
of self-awareness. On this account, any experience that lacks selfawareness is non-conscious (Zahavi, 2005, p. 16; cited in Dainton,
2008, p. 242).

the what-it-is-likeness of phenomenal states is properly speaking
a what-it-is-like-for-me-ness. On this view, experiential processes
are intrinsically conscious and hence self-revealing. They are
characterized by an inherent reflexive (not reflective) or prereflective self-consciousness in the weak sense that they are
like something for the subject, i.e., in virtue of their mere
existence, they are phenomenally manifest to the subject of those
experiences (Zahavi, in press; emphasis altered).

Dainton pushes back against this claim. “There is certainly
no obvious need to posit a quality of mineness to explain how
it is that we are always aware of our own experiences” (2008,
p. 242). Rather, Dainton holds that experiences are intrinsically
conscious and as such they “automatically contribute to the
overall character of their subject’s consciousness,” without any
“further assistance” by an additional quality of mineness. The
phenomenologists may be right that I, as experiencing subject, am
not usually in doubt about who the subject of my experience is,
and again Dainton cites Zahavi: “Whether a certain experience is
experienced as mine or not, however, depends not on something
apart from the experience, but precisely on the givenness of the
experience” (2005, p. 124). But then Dainton goes on to ask: “do
we need mineness to explain whether an experience is experienced
as mine?” (2008, p. 242). It’s not that Dainton doubts that one’s
experience is something that one is aware of living through –
it’s just that he doubts that we need the additional experience of
mineness to make it so. Rather, the sense of self is given by the
phenomenal background.5
Two things follow from Dainton’s analysis.6 “First, we can
account for the phenomenology of mineness without positing
any primitive ‘ownership’ quality” (p. 243). And second, a
reductionist view of our sense of self is possible – that is, “our
sense of self is not the product of a single simple form of

Likewise, Gallagher and Zahavi (2014) emphasize the intrinsic
or inherent nature of pre-reflective self-awareness.
Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate
way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my
experience. . .. [P]re-reflective self-consciousness is pre-reflective
in the sense that (1) it is an awareness we have before we do
any reflecting on our experience; (2) it is an implicit and firstorder awareness. . .. The mineness in question is not a quality like
being scarlet, sour or soft. It doesn’t refer to a specific experiential
content, to a specific what; nor does it refer to the diachronic
or synchronic sum of such content, or to some other relation
that might obtain between the contents in question. Rather, it
refers to the distinct givenness or the how it feels of experience. . ..
That pre-reflective self-awareness is implicit, then, means that I
am not confronted with a thematic or explicit awareness of the
experience as belonging to myself. Rather we are dealing with a
non-observational self-acquaintance.

‘Intrinsic’ means that it is built into the structure of such
experiences,7 not something added on. That it is an intrinsic
aspect of the phenomenal background is not something that
phenomenologists would disagree with. It is not clear, however,
that one should regard it as the “product” of the experiences
that make up the phenomenal background, as Dainton suggests,
since that way of putting it actually implies that it is something
in addition to those experiences. As I understand it, however,

5

I note that for Dainton, the sense of self is being equated with mineness or the
sense of ownership. As one reviewer pointed out, these are at least conceptually
distinct, in that a sense of self could be defined as a very basic form of selfconsciousness (e.g., sensitivity to self-specific information) without a sense of
ownership. What Dainton denies is that the sense of self or mineness is something
separate from the phenomenal background.
6
I leave aside the specifics of his argument about the isolation thesis – he does
think that it is difficult to rule out the idea that we might be able to experience an
“isolated and phenomenologically ownerless” sensation, i.e., that the phenomenal
background might in fact go missing.
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That it is built into the structure of experience is explained by Husserl, and
the phenomenologists who follow him, in terms of the temporal structure of
experience – the retentional-protentional structure that characterizes all of our
typical experiences. It would take us too far a field to sketch this analysis, but see
Gallagher (1998) for more detail.
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meditative trance and exceptional performance, the implication
is that these experiences, at the very least, would be exceptions to
the rule that everyday (non-exceptional) consciousness actually
does involve an implicit pre-reflective self-awareness. The
exceptions contrast to the more general fact of the matter –
otherwise they would not be so exceptional. Yet, this is clearly not
what Di Francesco and colleagues intend. Indeed, they suggest
there is “an extreme difficulty” in finding mineness in experience,
in contrast to the phenomenological claim that it would be
difficult (if not impossible) to find instances in which experience
was without a sense of mineness. Since they do indicate that this
is an empirical issue,8 the best way to address this conflict of
intuitions would be to cite empirical evidence. Di Francesco and
colleagues, however, question some of that evidence.
For example, they reject the idea that studies of neonate
imitation can offer any evidence that young infants have a prereflective sense of mineness. They consider any such appeal to
involve an adultist interpretation of infant experience.9 Despite
being fans of both contrastive strategies and operationalizing
phenomena, however, they ignore the precise operational
definition of neonate imitation that Meltzoff and Moore (1977)
adopt, namely differential imitation. Instead, they accept the
account given by Jones (2009), which ignores the operational
definition and treats tongue protrusion as simple arousal. The
point for Di Francesco and colleagues is that if neonate imitation
were just arousal, then there would be no proprioceptive
awareness necessary – and so, no SO. The operational definition
of neonate imitation adopted by Meltzoff and Moore, however, is
not the production of one gesture more often than an unrelated
one (as Keven and Akins, 2016, suggest). Rather, they, and the
majority of neonate imitation studies, operationalize imitation
as “the greater frequency of a gesture in response to the same
gesture than in response to other gestures” (Vincini et al., in
press, 2017). The operational definition entails reference to
a plurality of gestures exhibiting a comparative increase. As
Meltzoff and Moore were well aware, this is a crucial point since
if only one gesture is matched, then arousal would be the most
plausible explanation; the operational definition of differential
imitation was meant to exclude the arousal explanation. This
makes it an empirical question: is there evidence for differential
imitation? A recent study by Coulon et al. (2013), for example,

that is not Dainton’s intended claim, and in this respect (pace
his critique) he is in agreement with the phenomenological
conception of the sense of ownership.
Accordingly, for both Dainton and Bermúdez, the force of
their arguments against the phenomenological conception of
the SO as a form of pre-reflective self-awareness intrinsic to
experience can be turned around and redirected to show that in
fact the phenomenological conception is precisely the conception
that they need in order to make sense out of their own views, at
lease if we take them to be defending deflationary views.

THE ELIMINATIVIST ACCOUNT
I suggest that a similar philosophical Jujitsu can also be used
against the more sustained critique offered by Di Francesco
et al. (2016). They argue (citing Schear, 2009) that by using a
contrastive strategy we can find states of consciousness that prima
facie lack any kind of self-consciousness. Specifically, they cite
experiences involved in meditative trance and high-level athletic
performance.
In these kinds of mental states, we are completely immersed in a
certain task and forgetful, so to speak, of ourselves. We are one
and the same thing with a certain thing or task. However, this
strategy is not available to Gallagher and Zahavi, since it implies
that there are conscious but non-self-conscious states, whereas,
according to these authors and their followers, mineness is a
necessary ingredient of consciousness (2016, p. 79).

First, let me block the thrust of their point about meditative
trance. Perhaps it’s an open question, but it is not at all clear
how one can report on that state of consciousness if in fact at
the time of that experience one is not, at least, pre-reflectively
aware that one is in that state of consciousness. And if it is a
retrospective report, it implies that there was some minimal selfawareness present, and that the subject registered the experience
as his or her own; otherwise, it’s not clear how or why he or she
would be reporting it. Indeed, according to MacKenzie (2008),
reflexivist or self-illumination (svaprakāśa) theories in classical
Indian philosophy defend the idea that if a state is conscious, it is
simultaneously consciousness of both the object of consciousness
and the conscious state itself. In this respect, it is like Hume’s
famous claim not to be able to find a self among his experiences.
But the fact that he looks among his own experiences, rather than
anyone else’s (and it could not be otherwise), and reports it as
such (“whenever I enter into what I call myself ”), suggests that
there is some kind of implicit self-awareness that these are his
experiences. In any case, in regard to the claim about meditative
trance, it’s not clear what the evidence is.
Second, the evidence against Di Francesco and colleagues,
claim may be clearer with respect to high-level athletic
performance, since there are studies that show that in such
flow-like performance there still is some kind of pre-reflective
self-awareness involved [e.g., Christensen et al., 2016; likewise,
in dance (Legrand, 2007; Montero, 2012, 2016) and in flow-like
states during musical performance (Høffding, 2015; Salice et al.,
2017)]. Furthermore, as we noted with respect to pathological
experience, if Di Francesco and colleagues were right about
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Di Francesco and colleagues also indicate that no one is making a transcendental
claim in this regard. They go on, however, to suggest that the claim made by
phenomenologists may be a priori (2016, p. 79) or “heavily dependent on a priori
assumptions” which they associate with transcendental phenomenology (p. 78). To
suggest that the phenomenologists’ claim is a priori, however, is to misconstrue
the nature of phenomenology. Phenomenology is an appeal to experience if it is
anything at all. To be clear, one should distinguish between an a priori claim (i.e.,
a claim that is not based on experience) and a claim about an a priori aspect of
experience. Thus, when a phenomenologist claims that it is only in consultation
with one’s own experience that one can identify an implicit SO, this implies, on the
strongest interpretation, that such a thing is possible only because we, as human
experiencers, have experiences that are a priori our own. Whether this strong claim
is true or not, this is not an argument based on a priori assumptions; it’s based on
an appeal to experience.
9
Di Francesco and colleagues rightly suggest that there are two forms of adultism
(or what they call ‘adultocentrism’): the excluding kind (the infant is not like an
adult), or the projecting kind (the infant is like an adult) (2016, p. 82). It’s not clear
that they avoid the excluding form of adultism themselves since they make a lot of
claims about precisely what infants are lacking in their experience (see, e.g., p. 85).

5
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provides evidence for differential imitation. A more recent
study, Oostenbroek et al. (2016), fails to provide evidence for
differential imitation, but that may be because they employed
highly conservative criteria. If this question remains unsettled
in the literature, then the jury is still out, and Di Francesco
and colleagues cannot simply help themselves to their preferred
account.
In regard to the question of pre-reflective proprioceptive
self-awareness, the relevant aspect of what Meltzoff and Moore
showed was that that the infant’s imitation improved with
practice, implying that the infant was able to discriminate
between its own facial gesture and the gesture it saw on the other’s
face. This was regarded as evidence for a basic, proprioceptivebased distinction between self and non-self in newborns (see,
e.g., Bermuúdez, 1996; Gallagher, 1996).10 But if Di Francesco
and colleagues are not happy with the evidence from neonatal
imitation, that is not the only place one can find evidence for
this basic distinction. One can find it in turn-taking in protoconversation, and differential kinematic responses to self versus
non-self (Reddy, 2008). Even the fetus can discriminate the
difference between being moved and moving itself (Glass, 2005).
The differentiation is also built into touch, so that the sensorymotor system of the infant can register the difference between
someone else’s hand touching its face (eliciting the rooting reflex)
and it’s own hand touching its face (no rooting reflex) (Rochat
and Hespos, 1997). Even prior to birth the physiological requisites
for proprioception are in place (Humphrey, 1964; Van der Meer
et al., 1995).
This kind of evidence is, of course, open to interpretation. On
the one hand, Di Francesco and colleagues might argue that all
of this differentiation between self and non-self is really nonconscious. Whether or not that is the case for the late-term
fetus, however, it’s not clear why conscious discrimination in the
infant would need to wait until 4–5 months, as Di Francesco
and colleagues suggest. Indeed, Di Francesco and colleagues
they cite Bermúdez’s view on this: “Somatic proprioception and
the structure of exteroceptive perceptual experience can be a
source of non-conceptual first-person contents from the very
beginning of life” (Bermuúdez, 1998, p. 163; cited by Di Francesco
et al., 2016, p. 72). If the structure of perception contains
propriospecific information, for example, as the boundary of
the visual field that originates in the embodied perspective of
the agent, that just is the basis for the inbuilt structure of
pre-reflective self-awareness. As Di Francesco and colleagues
note, on this ecological view, “affordances, visual kinestesis and

bodily invariants all carry self-specifying information” which is
“precociously available to the child” (p. 83).
Although Di Francesco and colleagues don’t reject these
ecological claims, they do reject the idea that such experience
could be taken as evidence for pre-reflective self-awareness. Why?
I think we get to the real punch of their view here. They reject
ecological experience as a form of pre-reflective self-awareness in
younger infants because those younger infants do not yet have
a more advanced objective experience of their body as a whole.
First, they claim that ecological self-awareness is awareness of
“single parts of the body, not of the body taken as a whole” (p.
84). Yet ecological self-awareness may very well be awareness that
I am moving through the environment, for example, by walking
or running, or that I am sitting or standing still. It’s not at all clear
that such awareness is focused on one or several body parts rather
than the entire body.
Second, they claim that “when a baby, say, 6 or 8 months
old perceives, say, her hand, she perceives it as an object among
others, not as part of her body” (p. 84); to perceive it as part of
her body she would have to be able to represent her body as a
whole, which is not yet possible, according to Di Francesco and
colleagues. But isn’t this move already blocked by our previous
considerations? Although it may be clear that the child can indeed
take an objective view of her hand, and in this regard does not
have immunity to error with regard to identifying her hand as her
hand, it should also be clear from the evidence cited above, and
from the very nature of proprioception and kinaesthesis, the child
often and usually does have an agentive, first-person experience
of her hand as her own – as the one she is actively moving,
for example (Gallagher, 2015). Phenomenologists refer to this as
the body-as-subject (e.g., Legrand, 2007) or the body-as-agent
(the Leib), which is associated with body-schematic processes,
in contrast to body image, the body-as-object, or the objective
perception of one’s body (Gallagher, 2005). On any account of
SO that involves agentive body-schematic processes rather than
body image, the role of the body-as-object can only be secondary
or accessory (see, e.g., de Vignemont, 2007, in press). I’ll come
back to this point in the final section.
Di Francesco and colleagues claim, then, is that before an
agent can have a sense of her own body-as-subject – before she is
able to sense that her whole body is moving as she crawls around
or starts to walk – she must have developed a body image for her
whole body. She apparently just doesn’t have a sense that this
hand is her hand until a point in development when she has a
developed body image for her whole body. Thus, “we can say
that the newborn, like the infant at 6 months or 1 year of age,
produces a rich subjectivity, but being immersed in it, cannot
objectify it” (p. 85). Likewise for pain: the infant experiences pain,
but does not objectify herself as being in pain. For the infant to be
able to experience pain as her own pain, or her movement as her
own movement, or her body (or body part) as her own body, she
requires a developed, objective bodily self-consciousness which
comes, according to Di Francesco and colleagues at around
18 months with mirror self-recognition when the child is able to
form a body image of herself as a entire object and associate this
with herself as a subject – “the active source of the representation”
of herself (p. 85).

10

To be clear, in seeking empirical evidence for SO, as in many experiments and
discussions the focus usually shifts to the sense of body ownership or SO for
movement or action – this is my hand or this is my body, this is my movement –
and this involves proprioception and kinaesthesia. It is specifically the implicit
reflexive (or ecological, or auto- or self-awareness) character of proprioception
(giving me information about or awareness of myself) that is at stake here, rather
than the intentional or sensory content of the experience. As one reviewer notes,
“the mineness-feature is constant across sensory experiences irrespective of the
content.” In tactile experience, for example, I might touch different objects, X, Y,
and Z, but the touching experience is always mine because of its proprioceptive
nature. If X turns out to be my body (in the case of self-touch) proprioception is
doubled (and, as Martin, 1995 suggests, body ownership is tied to body boundary,
which is also proprioceptively defined). See Merleau-Ponty’s (2012) concept of
‘reversibility,’ discussed in the final section.

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

6

September 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1612

Gallagher

Self-defense

other modalities (touch, vision, interoception, etc.), provides a
pragmatic bodily awareness related primarily to the subject’s
action possibilities. The fact that, as Vignemont notes, it does
not give me a precise sense of my bodily posture, or shape, or
boundaries as I am lying in bed or am not moving, in contrast
to when I am moving, is not a problem since accuracy in such
circumstances is not that important. Even in regard to action, I
do not always need precision information about body boundary
or limb location, and, as I’ve suggested elsewhere (Gallagher, in
press), we get enough precision when we need it via the mix of
senses, and pragmatic estimates are good enough in most cases.
Indeed, if we take precision to mean objective position sense, this
is not something we need for most of our actions.
The enactivist point in this is that bodily experience, in
the form of proprioception, kinaesthesia, interoception, etc. is
action-oriented. In the same way that perception is enactive,
that is, oriented to the possibilities or affordances for action
and for responding to others, the proprioceptive-kinaesthetic,
pre-reflective SO contributes to how the body attunes to what
it can do. Proprioception, as position sense, i.e., as a positive
sense of where my limbs are (and the mineness of those limbs
being an implicit but still positive experience), is not simply the
registration of where my limbs are for the sake of knowing where
my limbs are, as if it were solving an epistemological or theoretical
problem. Rather, it addresses a pragmatic problem: if I want to
pick up a hammer, I don’t first of all have to go looking for my
hands – they are already ready to go.
In typical, everyday experience, SO readily integrates with
a sense of agency (SA) and in most cases SA and SO are
experientially indistinct, a fact that is consistent with the
deflationist account of SO and with an embodied enactivist
conception of SA (see Tsakiris et al., 2007; Gallagher, 2012, 2013;
Buhrmann and Di Paolo, 2015). Langland-Hassan (2008), for
example, suggests that the phenomenology of agency is “one
that is embedded in all first order sensory and proprioceptive
phenomenology as diachronic, action-sensitive patterns of
information; it does not stand apart from them as an inscrutable
emotion” (p. 392). Again, this is fully consistent with the
phenomenological view.
Not only does SO play a role in everyday pragmatic actions, it
also serves communicative actions and social interactions. This
is not a topic that I will develop in detail here (see Gallagher,
2005, 2017), but I want to at least give some indication of what
this role is. de Vignemont (2007) suggests that you experience SO
for your hand when another person touches it, in a way that you
do not feel SO for the touching hand. In this regard, MerleauPonty’s well-known example of one hand touching another, as
an example of what he calls ‘reversiblility,’ can help to show that
there is a potential for action (something action-oriented) in the
experience of my hand being touched, and not just an experience
of bodily location.
Merleau-Ponty’s example is first of all about my own
two hands. If I use my right hand to touch my left hand,
there is the immediate possibility of a reversibility – that my
right hand touching can immediately become the touched;
and my left hand touched can immediately become the
touching. If the touching-touched is in some objective sense

Di Francesco and colleagues claim here is largely definitional.
That is, they define self-consciousness precisely as an explicit
objective view of “the whole body of the organism [objectively]
experienced as one’s own body” (p. 85), and nothing less. On the
one hand, of course, if we accept this as the exclusive definition
of self-consciousness, then nothing like a pre-reflective selfawareness exists, full stop. On the other hand, to say that there
may be a developed perspective where one is able to make an
objective judgment about bodily ownership, is not to show that
self-specifying proprioceptive/kinaesthetic information does not
provide a pre-reflective sense of ownership for one’s experience,
one’s body, and/or one’s action. A more developed higherorder (conceptual and objective) form of self-consciousness
remains consistent with the existence of a pre-reflective sense of
ownership. Indeed, on some accounts, one requires just such a
proprioceptive sense of one’s own body to be able to recognize
it in the mirror. To opt for a purely higher-order conception of
self-consciousness is just to endorse a definition that, as Rochat
and Zahavi (2011, p. 206) put it, has “dramatic implications . . .
for our ascription of an experiential life to infants,” and opens a
larger set of questions, for example, about social cognition, than
can be explored here. In this respect, if opting for a more objective
conception of self-consciousness was meant to be a knockout
blow to the concept of a pre-reflective SO, Di Francesco and
colleagues are unable to land their strongest punch.

ACTION-ORIENTED OWNERSHIP
Di Francesco and colleagues suggest that phenomenologists fail
to offer a positive account of pre-reflective SO, and that it is
“characterized only negatively” and without reference to the
capacities or processes of self-consciousness (2016, pp. 86–87).
One might also think that a deflationary account, that takes SO
to be nothing over and above experience itself, will not give us a
positive account of this phenomenon. In this final section I want
to argue that phenomenologically inspired enactivist approaches
to experience and action, specifically involving the agentive body
(or the body-in-action), do provide a positive account of SO in
terms of the capacities and processes of self-consciousness.
One concern directly related to action is about reliability and
precision. In this regard, it is important to note that bodily
awareness, i.e., awareness not just of the body (body awareness),
but awareness of the world that includes pre-reflective selfawareness of my active moving body, following the ecological
view, is multimodal (see, e.g., Gallagher, 2005; Tsakiris, 2016).
There is good reason for this. Proprioceptive awareness of one’s
body is attenuated and not overly precise. The attenuation would
be a “flaw” (de Vignemont, 2014, p. 998), however, only if one
assumed that proprioception was supposed to deliver precise
awareness of the objective body. Proprioception, or any other
bodily sense, however, never functions just by itself (Dainton is
right about this), and reliability should be measured in terms
of the whole system and its integrated functioning. Moreover,
we should consider questions about reliability and precision
in pragmatic (action-oriented) terms rather than in epistemic
terms. In this case, proprioception, functioning along with
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simultaneous, in terms of our single-minded attention it is not;
it involves a dynamic sequential reversibility, not unlike the
reversing of the Necker cube in vision, but one that can be easily
done at will (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 141). My attention can go
back and forth between touching and being touched, attempting
to capture a structure that is pre-reflectively already established at
the sensory level. Each hand, whether touching or being touched
holds a relation to action, something actualized in the case of
touching, but only potential in the case of being touched. Even
as my one hand is touched, it holds a certain power for touching
which could reverse the action11 .
This is the case whether it is my own hand touching my
other hand, or, as in Vignemont’s example, someone else’s hand
touching mine. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty suggests that something
similar manifests itself in social interaction: “when touching the
hand of another, would I not touch in it the same power to
espouse the things that I have touched in my own?... [T]he
handshake too is reversible; I can feel myself touched as well and
at the same time as touching” (1968, pp. 141–142). I suggest that
these very basic, embodied contingencies, which Merleau-Ponty
associates with the phenomenon of ‘intercorporeity’ (2012, pp.
190–191; Gallagher, 2016), play a positive role in communicative
turn taking as well (Reddy, 2008). In the sensation of being
touched there is, along with a sense of location and boundary,
and the implicit SO that comes along with this, a sense of agency
to the extent that I have control over the reversibility – in effect, to
the extent that I can immediately turn the being touched into an
act of touching. This sense of agency, tied to my potentiality for
action and interaction, just to the extent that it is my hand that is
involved, is integrated with SO.
Given that the whole body can move and can touch or be
touched, this applies not just to hands. Likewise, this is not just
about proprioception. A pain in my leg can define what I can and
cannot do, and can diminish my sense of agency or potential for
action in the world. Interoceptive aspects of hunger or fatigue
may do the same. Proprioception, however, is important not
only for registering the location or position sense of my body.
Proprioception also plays a role in motor control, and without
proprioception we lose control over our body, and this can
diminish SA as well as SO12 .

There is one final point to be made in regard to a positive
action-related characterization of SO. The principle experimental
paradigm for studying a bodily sense of ownership is the Rubber
Hand Illusion (RHI) (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). It turns out,
however, that SO’s agentive function does not play a clear role
in the experience of the RHI. Although we can be tricked into
experiencing the rubber hand as our own, if the illusion is
maintained, the rubber hand seemingly plays no role in action
preparation; ownership seemingly serves no agentive function.
Vignemont, however, proposes an alternative agentive role for SO
that does persist through the RHI, namely, a self-defense role that
retains the connection between SO and body schematic processes,
and does not reduce SO to a pure body image phenomenon.
Rather than focus on the goal-directed instrumental movements
(pointing and grasping) that are tested (albeit infrequently)
in the RHI, she suggests that there is a “different range of
movements . . . worth exploring, namely defensive movements”
(in press).
[I]t has been repeatedly shown that participants react
[defensively] when the rubber hand is threatened, but only when
they report it as their own after synchronous stroking, and the
strength of their reaction is correlated with their ownership rating
in questionnaires (Ehrsson et al., 2007).

Vignemont thus suggests that SO has “a specific agentive
mark in the context of self-protection.” One might think
that this function is even more evolutionarily basic than SO’s
function in instrumental and communicative actions. It’s clear,
however, that the sense of ownership, described as a prereflective bodily self-awareness, can play important and positive
agentive roles in action, communication, and self-defense – and
this idea is not something that we should give up without a
fight.
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Gallese and Sinigaglia (2010), in their extensive of the empirical research, rightly
associate this with the concept of motor intentionality. They claim that this sense of
potentiality for action is more primitive and a necessary condition for both SO and
SA. A more deflated account would suggest that as an aspect of bodily experience
it is intrinsically integrated with SO and SA, part of what Merleau-Ponty (1964)
would call a ‘form’ or gestalt structure of the minimal self.
12
We see this in the case of IW who, when he first was unable to control his bodily
movement felt alienated from his body (Cole, 1995).
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